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Abstract: Do Trained Actors Learn Strategic Behaviour or Are They Se-
lected into Their Positions? Empirical Evidence from Penalty Kicking.
This paper studies if the Minimax theorem holds for the behaviour of trained
and untrained actors in the field. This is explored with data from 1043 football
penalty kicks from professionals of the German Bundesliga and for 268 penalty
kicks from untrained players. Minimax makes good predictions about the collective
patterns emerging from the behaviour of experienced actors, as well as about their
individual strategic actions. However, this is not true for untrained actors. In the
next step it is explored if, the professional players learned their behaviour, or if
they were selected into their roles because they had the required abilities. The
data suggests that the professionals were selected by the competitive conditions
of professional sports.
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1 Introduction
Zero-sum-interactions form an interesting class of social interactions. The actors have
opposing interests, and as long as both actors do not have completely altruistic prefer-
ences,1 then the actors must be selfish. In reality, zero-sum-interactions are often found
in situations where ego tries to catch alter, and alter tries to escape from ego. An often
cited example is the escape of Prof. Moriarty from Sherlock Holmes in A.C. Doyles
Novel “The final problem” (cf. also “Hide and Seek” from Rosenthal et al. 2003). Typ-
ical sociological phenomena that include zero-sum-interactions are crime and deviant
behaviour of different sorts (Tsebelis 1990). E.g., a thief tries to steal the property of
his victim. Potential victims try to evade thieves. The police try to capture the thieves
and the thieves try to evade the police. A corresponding white-collar crime is tax fraud.
A tax evader tries not to be caught by tax authorities, and authorities try to detect
tax fraud. Similarly terrorists try to hurt their victims. People try to evade terrorism
and authorities try to prevent acts of terrorism. Also interactions in sports as they are
analysed here, typically are zero-sum-interactions.
In such interactions typically there is a “gewisser Zirkel im Wesen der Sache” [a
certain circle in the character of the matter] (von Neumann 1928: 295). This means
that a thief will try to steal in situations where the potential victims are inattentive, and
where there is no police around. In turn, potential victims try to be attentive exactly
when there are thieves around, and the police tries to be in places where thievery
is expected. Thieves try to anticipate this provisions, and will not steal when their
victims are vigilant, and they are prone to be caught, and so on and so for. Indeed, not
only a few sociologists think that such zero-sum-interactions are logically unsolvable,
and therefore a priori unpredictable (cf. Berger and Hammer 2007a; Gansmann 2006;
Luhmann 1986). However, as early as 1928 von Neumann found the theoretical solution
for an utility maximizing behaviour in such zero-sum-interactions with the Minimax
theorem and the mixed strategy equilibrium resulting from it. Actors that behave
according to the Minimax strategy optimise their outcome and cannot be exploited by
any other strategic behaviour.
Several authors engaged in the empirical verification of the Minimax theorem (Chi-
appori et al. 2002; Hsu et al. 2007; Klaassen and Magnus 2001; Levitt et al. 2007;
McKelvey et al. 2000; Mookherjee and Sopher 2004; Moschini 2004; Ochs 1995; O’Neill
1987, 1991; Palacios-Huerta 2003; Palacios-Huerta and Volij 2008; Rapoport and Boebel
1992; Rosenthal et al. 2003; Shachat 2002; Walker and Wooders 2001) with the follow-
ing results: (1) Aggregate patterns are better explained by Minimax than individual
1This case is obviously extremley rare in reality.
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action. (2) Trained actors (namely: professional athletes) tend to behave optimally in
zero-sum-interactions, while untrained actors hardly do. (3) Particularly, optimal be-
haviour on the individual level is primarly found in professional athletes, but not with
untrained actors. These three results are valid for examinations in artificial laboratory
surroundings. (4) In real situations with high incentives professional athletes seem to act
optimally as well.2 For penalty kicks Bar-Eli et al. (2007) and Leiniger and Ockenfels
(2007), doubt if this holds for interactions more complex than with 2× 2 options.
Yet from a sociological point of view some questions remain unanswered. First, do
untrained actors also behave optimally in real zero-sum-interactions? In sociological
phenomena of that kind, some actors are experienced and others are not. Sometimes
trained actors interact with trained actors (e.g., thieves and the police, deceptive tax
consultants and tax authorities), sometimes trained actors interact with untrained ones
(e.g., thieves and their victims, tax authorities and occasional tax evaders), and some-
times untrained actors interact with untrained ones (e.g., suicide bombers and victims
of terror). If it should appear that untrained actors do not behave optimally in in
real zero-sum-interactions, a second question arises: Why do experienced actors behave
optimally in real zero-sum-interactions as opposed to unexperienced ones? Is optimal
strategic behaviour learned, or were trained actors selected into their positions because
they have had the required abilities?
Empirically, these questions are best examined with zero-sum-situations where sim-
ilar and highly standardised data of trained and untrained actors is available. Addi-
tionally, in order to test some theoretical propositions it is necessary to measure the
cardinal utility (Varian 1992) that actors derive from their outcomes. Therefore, as
others have done before, penalty kicks in football are used here for empirical testing.
This interaction is simple, and easy to observe with professional athletes and untrained
players. Furthermore, it seems plausible that scoring one goal has the same utility for
all kickers, and that this utility is exactly opposed to the utility of a failed penalty kick.
In addition, the same holds for the goalkeepers. A stopped penalty kick has the same
cardinal utility for all goalies, and has the same absolute value as a received goal.
The paper is organised as follows: In the next section (2) the Minimax theorem is
applied to penalty kicking. Here, this interaction is modeled with the centre option as
a 3× 3 decision. The concluding patterns on the aggregate level and for the individual
behaviour of single players are derived. In the following empirical part these hypotheses
are examined with two data sets (cf. section 3): One consists of data on all 1043
penalty kicks that occurred during the seasons 1993/94 to 2003/04 in the first league of
Germany (Bundesliga). The second set consists of data from visitors at a science fair
2Kovash and Levitt (2009) form an exception.
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who kicked 268 penalties to trained youth goalkeepers. The results in section 4 show
that for professional players the emerging patterns on the aggregate level, as well as
the behaviour of indvidual athletes, are predicted quite well by the Minimax theorem.
However, this is not true for amateur players. Neither the aggregate patterns, nor the
individual decisions of unexperienced actors are hardly predictable by Minimax. Section
5 analyses if the strategically optimised action of professional players is the result of
individual training, or if professionals were selected into their positions. With further
inspection of the data and additional evidence it can be shown that selection seems to
be of more importance than individual training. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Theory: Minimax and penalty kicking in football
In zero-sum-interactions the actors’ interests are exactly opposed. One actor’s profit
corresponds to the other actor’s loss. Typical for that is a circle of mutual expectations,
which seems to lead to an infinite regress. This is well illustrated with penalty kicking.
There the player tries to kick the ball into the goal from a distance of 11.00m. The size
of the goal (7.32m wide and 2.44m high) forces the goalkeeper to form an expectation
about the side chosen by the kicker. If the goalkeeper jumps only shortly after the ball
was kicked he could never save the ball because human reaction time and jumping power
would be insufficient (Johanni and Tschachner 2005). Therefore the goalkeeper must
decide for one side of the goal if he hopes to reach the ball. If his assumption regarding
the corner chosen by the kicker is correct, his chance of saving the ball is improved, but
still is not high. In principle, the goalkeeper could also choose to stay in the centre. This
strategy has the advantage that the ball can be saved mostly if it is actually directed
to the centre. But with the same certainty the result will be a goal if this is not the
case and the kick is directed to one of the corners. There is the possibility to save a
ball directed at the centre with the feet when jumping to one of the sides. But because
legs are not as flexible and manoeuvrable as arms, such a defence is hard to manage
and requires some luck.3 The strategic decision making problem now occurs because
the penalty kicker is aware of the goalkeeper’s options. He will adjust his expectations
accordingly. If he assumes that the goalkeeper will jump to the left he will kick to the
right and vice versa. This will in turn prompt the goalkeeper to choose the opposite
3While the shoulder joint allows for movements in all directions, the hip joint restricts movement to
a certain radius (personal communication with Daniel Ackermann and Jochen Berger, Departement of
Sports, University of Leipzig). Table 5 gives a hint about the empirical probabilities of a missed goal
with a kick to the centre (25.8% when jumping left, 36% when jumping right). However, we do not
know if the ball was stopped with the feet.
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side, etc. Optionally, the kicker may also kick to the centre if he expects the goalkeeper
to jump to either side.4 If the goalkeeper is expecting this he may also stay in the centre,
etc.
The optimal behaviour in such a situation consists of being unpredictable. This is
the case if the expected utilities for all the opponent’s alternatives are equal and the
opponent therefore is indifferent towards his alternatives. Therefore, the goalkeeper
should behave in a manner so that the probability of scoring for the kicker is equal for
each area of the goal. The kicker in turn should make his choice so that the goalkeeper’s
saving probability is equally high for all areas of the goal. This condition can be applied
to any number of the goal’s areas. The theoretical conclusions do not depend on the
considered areas of the goal. Rather, the appropriate model is set by the available data.
Therefore, a model with three options is used here.
The resulting solution is an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which both players
randomly choose their alternatives from a certain probability distribution. To calculate
these probabilities it is necessary to determine the players’ cardinal utilities (Varian
1992). This can be done plausibly and easily with penalty kicks. For this purpose it
is assumed that a scored goal has the same cardinal utility in an absolute value as a
received goal, namely 1. This actually makes the match a zero-sum-interaction (however:
see Bar-Eli et al. 2007; Leiniger and Ockenfels 2007).5
With this prerequisite the Minimax theorem can be applied to penalty kicks. Thus,
the theory used therefore is standard game theory (see e.g. Dixith and Skeath 2004 for
illustrations with sports). Several technical elements of penalty kicks are added, such as
the fact that a kicker has a favoured kicking foot (similar to right-handedness). Every
player (also professional ones) uses this kicking foot. For anatomic reasons a right-
footed player kicks the ball with his right foot more precisely, harder and therefore with
a higher probability of scoring to the left (as seen by the kicker) than to the right (and
vice versa).6 With kickers shooting to the right, therefore, the right side, as seen by the
4A kick to the centre has the favourable characteristic that the ball at least does not miss the goal.
The aspect of not missing the goal at all is of minor importance for accurate kicking trained players.
But it is important for untrained players (see below section 2.1 and 4.1.2).
5Bar-Eli et al. (2007) doubt this for professional goalkeepers in 3× 3 interactions. Yet, they do not
model the zero-sum-interaction as a strategic situation of interdependence, but as parametric decision
under risk. In addition, this paper suffers from several empirical flaws (cf. Berger 2009). Leiniger and
Ockenfels (2007) apply game theory, but nevertheless dismiss the assumption that penalty kicking is a
zero-sum-interaction for some models. These models are not tested empirically and are mainly based
on the expert opinion and anecdotes of professional keepers (Schumacher, Butt). Some of these stylized
facts used by Leiniger and Ockenfels (2007) are proved to be wrong in this study (see section 2.2, 4.2).
One hypothesis of Leiniger and Ockenfels (2007) is tested (cf. H7 below).
6Personal communication with Daniel Ackermann and Jochen Berger, Departement of Sports, Uni-
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goalkeeper, is described as the “natural” (N) side for goalkeeper and kicker. For kickers
shooting with the left foot the natural side is the left side, as seen by the goalkeeper,
which is also described as “natural”. Each opposite side is for purposes of legibility
described as “left” (L). The centre remains unchanged in this view. Yet, depending
on the exact angle of run-up, the kicking technique remains the same for kicks to the
centre and to the natural side.7 With this technical argument kicks to the centre can
be counted as kicks to the natural side (cf. Palacios-Huerta 2003). We will refer to
this procedure below when case numbers are too small to make a difference between the
centre and the natural side.
The kicking foot and with it the kicker’s natural side are known by the goalkeeper
from the kicker’s run-up (from the left in order to kick with the right foot, and vice versa).
And the kicker is aware of the fact that the goalkeeper knows his natural side etc. Thus,
since the kicking foot is common knowledge (e.g. Geanakoplos 1992), neither player has
an advantage of this information, and the strategic situation remains unchanged by this
asymmetry. The same is true for any feint of kicker and goalkeeper. They do not change
the game strategically and its circular characteristic, because the opponent never knows
if the feint is a feint or not.8
Several authors demonstrated the derivation of hypotheses on penalty kicks from
the Minimax theorem starting from the aforementioned game description (Chiappori
et al. 2002; Moschini 2004; Palacios-Huerta 2003). In the next section we present the
assumptions of the fundamental model of Chiappori et al. (2002) without repeating the
complete underlying analyses.
2.1 Theoretical assumptions
Figure 1 shows the payoff matrix of the game with the probabilities of scoring for the
kicker.9 From the above considerations some assumptions result about the sequence
of the probabilities of scoring a goal depending on the chosen sides, namely: (1) The
versity of Leipzig.
7Personal communication with Daniel Ackermann, Departement of Sports, University of Leipzig.
8It is worthy to give some examples on this behaviour, because there exist many anecdotes about
it. E.g. a kicker can “lean into” one side while running up, feigning that they will kick to this side.
However, the goalie does not know if the kicker is only feigning, or really shooting into this corner, etc.
The goalie can position himself closer to one of the posts, in order to give the impression to the kicker,
that he will jump to the closer post. But, the kicker does not know if the goalkeeper is only trying to
bluff him, or if he will actually jump to this side, etc.
9Because the cardinal utility of scoring a goal is assumed to be 1, the probabilities correspond to
the payoff.
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Figure 1: Payoff matrix (probabilities of scoring) of the penalty kick for
the kicker with strategies left, centre and right.
goalie
left centre right
left PL QL QL
kicker centre M ν M
right QR QR PR
The strategy choice “right” indicates the kick or the jump to the kicker’s natural side.
probability of scoring is obviously higher if the keeper chooses the wrong side as opposed
to choosing the same side as the kicker (QR > PL and QL > PR). (2) Also, a kick to the
opposite of the goalkeepers side has a higher probability of conversion than a kick to
this same side when the goalkeeper stays in the centre (QR > M and QL > M). In the
latter case the goalkeeper has a chance to stop a ball if it is not precisely directed close
to the post. In the former case, there is no chance to stop the ball at all. (3a) Of two
misguessed kicks on the goalkeepers part, kicks to the natural side have a probability
of being converted that is equal or higher than the probability for kicks to the “left”
side (QR ≥ QL). This is due to the higher speed and especially precision of kicks to the
natural side. (3b) For the same reason, of two kicks where the goalkeepers chooses the
correct side, kicks to the natural side have a probability of being converted that is equal
or higher than the probability for kicks to the “left” side ( PR ≥ PL). (4) Because kicks
to the natural side are easier to convert, it is less important if the keeper guesses the
natural side correctly, than it is on the “left” side (QL − PL ≥ QR − PR).
Because the game is considered a zero-sum-interaction the same assumptions (just
reversed) are made for the goalies. In addition, it is assumed that these assumptions are
common knowledge (e.g. Geanakoplos 1992) for the players. For the empirical analysis it
is important to remember that the above assumptions actually hold for specific penalty
kicks. Only if there is no heterogeneity in the population of all penalty kicks, do the
above assumptions hold for the aggregate of all penalties as well.
From tables 5 it can be learned that for the professional athletes of the Bundesliga
the assumptions hold, with the partial exception of assumption (3). The scoring prob-
abilities for [N, L] are slightly lower (91.8%) than those for [L, N] (96.0). From table 9
and 10 it can be seen that for the untrained players, the last assumption (4) does not
hold at all. With these assumptions a set of testable hypotheses for the macro level of
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social patterns and for the micro level of individual players can be derived. Not all as-
sumptions are necessary for all hypotheses. Therefore the consequences of the unfulfilled
assumptions will be discussed with the corresponding hypotheses.
2.2 Theory: macro level
If kickers and goalkeepers behave strategically optimal in a penalty kick, the following
statements should apply to the emergent aggregate patterns:
H1: The randomisation of kickers and goalies are independent of each other.
H2: The combination [natural, natural] ([N, N]) is more probable than both the combi-
nations [left, natural] ([L, N]) and [natural, left] ([N, L]). These however, are more
probable than the combination [left, left] ([L, L]).
This hypothesis is, among others, based on assumption (4). If the hypothesis
cannot be empirically justified for the amateur players, this might be attributed
to the assumption only being partly fulfilled.
H3: The probability of kickers shooting to the centre is higher than the probability of
goalkeepers remaining in the centre.
H4: The probability of goalkeepers choosing the kicker’s natural side is higher than the
one of the kicker shooting the ball there.
H5: (a) The kickers have a higher probability of choosing their natural sides than of
choosing their other sides.
(b) The goalkeepers have a higher probability of choosing the kickers’ natural
sides than of choosing their other sides.
This hypothesis is based on assumption (3). If the hypothesis cannot be empirically
justified for professional players this might be because this assumption is only
partly fulfilled.
H6: (a) The probability of scoring a goal is equally high, regardless of the side the
kicker shoots to.
(b) The probability of saving a goal is equally high, regardless of the side the
goalkeepers chooses.
These hypotheses are interesting from a sociological point of view for several reasons. (1)
They refer to aggregates which are the explananda of sociology (e.g. Coleman 1986).
(2) Emergent aggregate patterns are not the trivial result (e.g., by averaging) of the
8
actors’ micro motives. But although for the goalkeeper the easiest kicks to stop are the
ones to the centre, this does not mean that they should choose this option most often.
On the contrary, because the players interact, the opponents outcome must be taken
into account which leads to H3 (cf. Berger 2009).
Leininger and Ockenfels (2007) postulate a game theoretic model including a kick to
the centre as well. This kick has the favourable characteristic that the ball will at least
not miss the goal. However, for trained actors Leininger and Ockenfels (2007), do not
expect to find any empirical difference between their game theoretic model compared
to the here presented Minimax model. Professional players with good technical abilities
hardly ever suspect that the ball flies into an unintended direction. This is different for
untrained scorers. Due to lacking technical abilities there is always a chance that the
ball will deviate significantly from the location aimed at. Therefore, a kick to the centre
is favourable because it offers the highest fault tolerance. Even if poorly kicked, there is
chance that the ball is directed to the goal and by that fulfills the essential prerequisite
for a successful kick. Thus, Leininger and Ockenfels (2007) conclude the following:
H7: Trained kickers shoot to the centre less frequently than untrained kickers.
2.3 Theory: micro level
Some hypotheses do not refer exclusively to a social phenomenon which can be assigned
to the interaction of both actors, but can instead also be applied to individual actors.
If they behave optimally in penalty kicks the following hypotheses should apply.
H5ind: (a) The kicker has a higher probability of choosing his natural side than of
choosing the other side.
(b) The goalkeeper has a higher probability of choosing the kicker’s natural side
than of choosing his other side.
H6ind: (a) The probability of scoring a goal is equally high, regardless of the side the
kicker shoots to.
(b) The probability of saving a goal is equally high, regardless of the side the
goalkeepers chooses.
Furthermore, hypothetical statements concerning the behaviour in a sequence of
penalties for single players can be made. Valid is here as well that the players have
to remain unpredictable for their opponents. This means that the behaviour during a
penalty cannot be concluded from the prior kick. Such a pattern (e.g. “every second kick
to the natural side”) could be exploited by the opponent. With optimising behaviour of
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individual players both statements on strategies in a sequence of penalties must therefore
apply.10
H8: (a) Kickers generate a random order of “left” and the natural side.
(b) Goalkeepers generate a random order of “left” and the natural side.
3 Data
These hypotheses are examined with two data sets. One consists of data on penalty kicks
from professional players. It contains data on individual players who were repeatedly
involved in penalty kicks and therefore allows for tests on individual level. The second
data set was collected through observing penalties of untrained amateurs and is not
suitable for individual testing.
3.1 Data on trained professional players
This data set consists of data on all 1043 penalty kicks that occurred during the seasons
1993/94 to 2003/04 in the first league of Germany (Bundesliga). The data was collected
by four professional observers coding the same game independently and simultaneously.
This data collection takes place routinely by the firm Impire AG in order to sell up-to-
date data sets to the observed teams and their opponents. Therefore the data can be
expected to be most objective.
3.2 Data on untrained players
Data on untrained players was collected at a science fair. This fair was one event that
took place within the scope of the “year of mathematics”, which the German government
had proclaimed in 2008. It took place on the most central square in Leipzig. The visitors
were to be given an understanding of the mathematical elements of everyday situations.
One stand at the fair was occupied with football, and amongst other things the Minimax
theorem and penalty kicks. The fair occurred simultaneously to the European Football
Championship, which caused a high interest in the stand. Admission was free and the
fair was attended by interested visitors and pupils as well as tourists and passers-by. In
front of the exhibition tent a goal was set up. Due to spatial concerns it was a youth
goal (5.00m wide and 2.00m high). The penalties were kicked from a distance of 9.00m.
10Anticipating the empirical test, these hypotheses are stated for only two alternatives, since insuffi-
cient data is available for a test with three options.
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Table 1: Description of penalties in the professional Bundesliga.
direction of kicks and jumps, respectively
kicking foot actual/natural result
L R L centre R goal missed saved
kickers 377 666 441/433 151 451/459 788 51
goalies 520/542 17 506/484 204
The first figure in the cell of kicking or jumping direction L (left) and R (right) indicates the actual
direction of the kick or the jump, each as seen by the executing player. The second number refers to
the natural and unnatural “left” direction as seen by the goalkeeper; kicks and jumps to the right side
(as seen by the goalkeeper) with right-footed players are counted as natural and with left-footed players
as unnatural. “missed” stands for the ball hitting the goal frame or missing the goal, “saved” indicates
“saved by the goalkeeper”.
These dimensions comply with the youth football guidelines. The bottom surface in the
goal was padded with mats, which allowed for safe jumps (see figure 2).
There were two youth goalkeepers aged 12 from a local club. The goalkeepers received
a small compensation and were - apart from the compensation - highly motivated. They
had been playing football for six, respectively seven years and were trained well.11 By
their own account they were striving to emulate their role model Adler.12 Visitors could
kick a penalty after filling out a questionnaire which asked for age, sex and kicking foot
(left or right). Furthermore, they were asked whether they had ever played organised
football, and if so, for how long.13 The ball was released upon the blow of a whistle, which
increased the situation’s seriousness. All the visitors were highly intent upon placing
the ball in the goal, and were not considered with the keepers young age. Children and
adolescents were especially interested in the opportunity. However, also a significant
number of older visitors, mainly those who had once played football, took part as well.
This self-selection certainly leads to the fact that the observed sample is biased, when
compared with the normal population. Women were particularly underrepresented (only
9% of the participants were female).14 And clearly most participants had an affinity
towards football. Because of that, the situation did not exactly comply with one under
11Sometimes they were accompanied by their special goalkeeping coach.
12The goalkeeper Adler also comes from Leipzig and is a keeper of the German national team.
13The goalkeepers were not privy to the information in the questionnaires. The kicking foot however,
became apparent to them through the run-up. They could also estimate the scorers age, but still did
not know about the kickers football knowledge.
14In contrast to the US, in Europe football is predominately a male sport.
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Figure 2: Goal and goalkeeper on the science fair
professional conditions. The following points were different: (1) All the dimensions
were smaller. (2) The goalkeepers had higher technical abilities, better equipment and
preparation than the kickers who queued up wearing casual clothes. Both leads to the
fact that in this setting the goalkeeper had a higher chance of saving the ball than
under professional conditions. This is also reflected in the data. With the untrained
players approximately two out of five kicks resulted in a goal. With professional players
this is the case in about three out of four kicks (cf. table 5 and 9/10). However, the
strategic situation remained unaffected by that, since the game matrix stayed the same.
Therefore, the circle of expectations concerning the directions of jumps and kicks existed
in a way that it does in professional players. This is no longer valid as soon as the ball
is moving slowly enough such that the goalkeeper has enough time to react and jump
12
Table 2: Description of untrained players.
n x¯ s min max
age (in years) 268 23.73 10.32 11 49
sex (1=male) 268 0.91 0.29 0 1
right-footedness (1=yes) 268 0.91 0.29 0 1
ever played football? (1=yes) 268 0.46 0.50 0 1
if yes: how many years? 122 6.81 6.34 1 36
before the ball has travelled the complete 9m to the goal line. This happens rarely, even
with untrained kickers, who usually do not lack power, but precision. With very young
and old kickers however, leg power can be insufficient for giving the ball necessary speed.
For that reason, kickers younger than 10 and older than 50 were excluded from the data
set. Of the former there were 33 and of the latter only 9. These cut-off points are only
justified by common sense, and they do not ensure that there indeed was a simultaneous
decision made by all remaining participants. With single kickers it was obvious for all
people involved that the ball was not kicked hard enough. If these cases had also been
excluded, (e.g. directly during observation) it may justly be objected that by doing so
each desired empirical result could be obtained. Therefore, we abstain from this purely
arbitrary reduction. If it becomes clear that the Minimax theorem is also valid in this
case, then it would be a strong argument in favour of its application to most different
zero-sum-interactions.
When interpreting the results it must be kept in mind that the data of the untrained
players are less precise than those of the professional ones, since the codification of the
penalty kick had to be done immediately the observer. The data of the professional
players were collected by four independent observers with the aid of records. Table 2
describes the untrained players and table 3 their behaviour during penalty kicks.
4 Results
Here we present the results for the aggregate social patterns: first for the professional
players and then for the untrained players. With the latter it is denoted whether the
kickers had ever played football before (amateurs) or not (absolute beginners). The first
group is assumed to be familiar with the strategic decision situation. If any learning
effect occurs, trained amateurs should behave more optimally than entirely untrained
beginners. In this case, the goalkeepers should be a bit better on average than the
13
Table 3: Description of penalties kicked by untrained players.
direction of kicks and jumps, respectively
kicking foot actual/natural result
L R L centre R goal missed saved
kickers 24 244 125/103 46 97/119 106 46
goalies 60/58 46 162/164 116
The first figure in the cell of kicking or jumping direction L (left) and R (right) indicates the actual
direction of the kick or the jump, each as seen by the executing player. The second number refers to
the natural and unnatural “left” direction as seen by the goalkeeper; kicks and jumps to the right side
(as seen by the goalkeeper) with right-footed players are counted as natural and with left-footed players
as unnatural. “missed” stands for the ball hitting the goal frame or missing the goal, “saved” indicates
“saved by the goalkeeper”.
trained amateurs, since they have to make the strategic decision very often and should
hence become better. In addition, they were a priori better trained than the average
kicker.
4.1 Results: macro level
With the test on the macro level a statistical aggregation problem arises. The empiri-
cally measured frequency and proportions reflect the theoretically expected probability
only if all players and penalty kick situations are homogenous. It is however possible
that, e.g. for the professionals a penalty kick at the beginning of a match - at a moment
when there is still time for an opportunity to compensate for a missed kick - repre-
sents a different interaction than one at the end of the match. If in the population of
the observed penalty kick situations such a heterogeneity existed, the probability mea-
surement would be biased. For the data set of the German Bundesliga at least some
possible assumptions of heterogeneity can be excluded. There are homogeneous penalty
kick situations independent from the score, playing time, the player’s kicking foot and
the player acting (cf. Berger und Hammer 2007a and 2007b). Heterogeneity which was
theoretically already included exists in the player’s kicking direction, which depends on
his kicking foot. However, the potential sources of heterogeneity are principally un-
known. This is valid especially for the untrained players’ data set. On the one hand it
has to be assumed that more heterogeneity is present there than with the professional
players. On the other hand it is not known what this heterogeneity can be ascribed to.
Therefore, an adequate control is not possible.
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Chiappori et al. (2002: 1143) show that some of the postulated hypotheses are
robust, and unaffected by unobserved heterogeneity in the data. For the particular case
of our data, hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 should also hold with heterogeneity in the data, as long
as the hypotheses are expressed as statements of frequencies instead of as statements of
probabilities. Because this analysis compares trained actors to untrained ones, a test
strategy is pursued where the hypotheses are tested as statements of frequencies, as far
as this is feasible. Otherwise this difficulty is referred to in the interpretation.
4.1.1 Results: trained players
The hypotheses were tested in the outlined order for professional players from the Ger-
man Bundesliga.
H1: Independence of kickers’ and goalies’ strategies. Table 4 shows the combined
strategy choices of kickers and goalkeepers in the German Bundesliga. This allows to
estimate the association between the kicker’s shooting direction and the goalkeeper’s
decision. There is no association (χ2 = 2.4, df = 4, p = 0.66).
Table 4: Empirical distribution of strategies of professional Bundesliga goalies and kick-
ers in absolute frequencies and percentages.
goalkeeper
left centre right
left 202 19.4% 6 0.6% 225 21.6% 433 41.5%
kicker centre 62 5.9% 3 0.3% 86 8.2% 151 14.5%
right 220 21.1% 8 0.8% 231 22.1% 459 44.0%
484 46.4% 17 1.6% 542 52.0% 1043 100%
The strategy choice “right” indicates the kick or the jump to the kicker’s natural side. (Percentages
may not add up to 100 due to rounding.)
H2: Sequence of strategy combinations: As predicted, the combination [N, N] is most
likely (22.1%), followed by [L, N] (21.6%) and [N, L] (21.1%). The rarest of the four
combinations is [L, L] (19.4%). A maximum-likelihood test shows that the differences
between [N, N] and [L, L], as well as between [N, N] and [L, N] are not significant. So
the predicted order is found with partly lacking significance.
H3: Probability of the option “centre”: It is clearly observable that the kickers have
a significantly higher probability of kicking the ball into the centre than the goalkeepers
have of staying there (t = 17.1).
H4: Choice of natural side by goalkeeper and kicker together : The probability of
goalkeepers jumping to the natural side (52.0%) is higher than that of kickers shooting
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Table 5: Empirical distribution of scoring probability percentages for professional kickers
in the Bundesliga.
goalie
left centre right
left 52.5 83.3 96.0 75.5
kicker centre 74.2 33.3 64.0 67.5
right 91.8 100.0 64.5 78.2
73.1 82.4 77.5 75.6
The strategy choice “right” indicates the kick or the jump to the kicker’s natural side. The figures in
the cells correspond to the empirical probabilities of scoring (i.e. the ratio of scored goals and kicks)
for the kicker in the respective strategy combination. The probability of saving for the goalkeeper is
the resulting converse probability.
the ball there (44.0%). Corresponding t-tests show that this discrepancy is not signifi-
cant. If however, it is assumed that there is unidentified heterogeneity in the data and
the hypothesis is expressed as frequencies, the present discrepancies definitely remain
significant (t = −2.6).
H5: Choice of natural side by the kicker and goalkeeper : The kickers actually choose
the natural right side in 44.0% of all cases and therefore significantly more often than
the left side with 41.5% of all cases (KS test: z=15.5, asymptotical significant p=0.00).15
The same is true for goalkeepers who seem to anticipate that it is favourable for
the kicker to shoot to the natural side and jump to this side with a significantly higher
probability (52.0%) than to the left side (46.4%). This discrepancy is significant (KS
test: z=16.9, asymptotical significant p=0.000).16
H6: Equality of success probability for all strategies for kickers and goalkeepers:
Table 5 shows that especially the sides for kickers and goalkeepers have similar success
probabilities. For the choice of the centre this is valid to a slightly lower degree.
The actual scoring probability however, corresponds to the expected utility of choos-
ing a certain side. This results from the product of the expected utility after choosing a
certain strategy and the probability with which the strategy is chosen. Since the kicker’s
natural side is in fact connected to less effort (because it is easier to be kicked), a kick
to this side should occur more often. However, the exact effort is a priori unidentified
and can only be estimated empirically from the observed probabilities of scoring. From
15Alternatively, a t-test may be carried out here. This shows in both data sets that the distribution
does not significantly differ from a 50:50 distribution (t = 0.9).
16A t-test however shows a weakened significance (t = 1.8).
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those observations an optimal mixture of strategies can be concluded. The derivation
of this mixed equilibrium is apparently difficult to grasp intuitively (cf. Bar-Eli et al.
2007; Berger 2009; Luhmann 1986). A formal derivation of optimally mixed strategies
can therefore be found in the appendix. Following this procedure, the values indicated
in table 6 result from the Bundesliga data.17
Table 6: Predicted and actual probabilities of strategy choices for kickers and goalkeepers
in the German Bundesliga in percentages.
kicker goalie
left centre right left centre right
Predicted 38.6 0.0 61.4 44.5 0.0 55.5
actual 41.5 14.5 44.0 46.4 1.6 55.1
The strategy choice “right” indicates the kick or the jump to the kicker’s natural side.
The kickers of the German Bundesliga are stunningly successful in keeping the goal-
keepers indifferent towards their three options. However, they too often choose the
centre at the expense of the natural side.
Therefore, the predictions for the trained actors on the aggregate level can be confirmed
also for interactions with 3× 3 options. The expected effects always become apparent.
With the test strategy of regarding the hypotheses as statements of frequency the effects
are also significant. An exception is hypothesis 6, which can only be tested using point
estimations. A certain fuzziness can be noticed there, so that it cannot be distinctly
said from which point on the hypothesis would have to be considered falsified. In total,
the expected aggregate patterns were found for the trained expert players.
4.1.2 Results: untrained players
With the hypotheses tests for the untrained players a distinction is made between those
actors who have no experience in football (absolute beginners, B) and amateurs (A),
who - even if briefly or a long time ago - have played football. The observation of these
kickers suggests that almost all of them have the ability to kick the ball with enough
power in the intended direction. This is not necessarily true for the group of beginners.
Although here kickers with insufficient leg power are excluded (see above), observation
of the beginners showed that in a minority group the technical and/or physiological
abilities were underdeveloped to the point that the observed kicks seemed erratic and
17The calculations were made using the software “Gambit” (see http://econweb.tamu.edu/gambit).
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hardly realisable in regards to the respective intention. For the empirical analysis of the
untrained players it is therefore an a priori assumption that in principle, strategically
optimal behaviour is measurable for goalkeepers and amateurs (in this order). This is
not valid for the beginners. If they do not demonstrate any optimal behaviour, this may
be due to to lacking technical abilities and not necessarily due to not optimal intentions.
The testing is done analogously to the testing of the professional players. Since
the data set potentially holds unidentified heterogeneity the hypotheses are tested -
if possible - as frequency statements. Only when this is not possible, the probability
statement is used.
H1: Independence of kickers’ and goalies’ strategies. Table 7 and 8 show the common
distribution of strategy choices by hardly trained and entirely untrained kickers and
goalkeepers. It becomes obvious that in both cases the involved players’ decisions are
not independent from each other (A: χ2 = 21.7, df = 4, p = 0.000; B: χ2 = 63.4, df =
4, p = 0.000). As expected, this is true to a higher degree for the absolute beginners
than for the amateurs. In both cases the goalkeepers tend to react to the kickers. The
aggregate simultaneity of both decisions is therefore not provided. This does not mean
that there are no simultaneous actions of goalkeeper and kicker. Rather it may mirror
the above mentioned fact that some kickers in the sample obviously did not have the
necessary abilities for a enough powerful kick.
It is a common difficulty with empirical work in the field that not all theoretically
necessary conditions can be easily met. The usual approach then is not to cancel the
whole analysis, but rather to give an adequate interpretation of the results. I.e. that
(1) if it becomes clear that the Minimax theorem is still valid even if one prerequisite
for applying it is not fulfilled, then it would be a strong argument in favour of game
theoretic analysis. (2) Because the keepers tend to react to the kickers, it is supposed
to find the predicted patterns (if anything) with the untrained kickers, that must have
made some strategic calculations.
H2: Sequence of strategy combinations: The combination [N, N] is, as predicted, the
most probable one (A: 38.6%; B: 37.7%), followed by the combination [L, N] (A: 18.9%;
B: 17.8%). The rarest of the four combinations is not - different from what was expected
- [L, L] (A: 17.2%; B: 15.1%), but instead (and by far) the combination [N, L] (A: 4.9%;
B: 3.4%). It becomes obvious again that the goalkeepers tend to react to the kickers.18
H3: Probability of the option “centre”: Accordingly, this hypothesis can also not be
confirmed. The goalkeepers (A: 15.6%; B: 18.5%) stay in the centre almost as often
as the kickers (A: 14.8%; B: 15.1%) shoot the ball there. This can benevolently be
interpreted to the effect that the goalkeepers anticipate that the kickers frequently want
18This also mirrors the fact that the assumptions for this hypothesis are only partially met.
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Table 7: Empirical distribution of amateur kicker and the goalie of strategies in absolute
frequencies and percentages.
goalie
left centre right
left 21 17.2% 7 5.7% 23 18.9% 51 41.8%
kicker centre 1 0.8% 6 4.9% 11 9.0% 18 14.8%
right 6 4.9% 6 4.9% 41 38.6% 53 43.4%
28 23.0% 19 15.6% 75 61.5% 122 100%
The strategy choice “right” indicates the kick or the jump to the kicker’s natural side. (Percentages
may not add up to 100 due to rounding.)
Table 8: Empirical distribution of completely unexperienced kicker’s strategies and the
goalies in absolute frequencies and percentages.
goalie
left centre right
left 22 15.1% 4 2.7% 26 17.8% 52 35.6%
kicker centre 3 2.1% 17 11.6% 8 5.5% 28 19.2%
right 5 3.4% 6 4.1% 55 37.7% 66 45.2%
30 20.5% 27 18.5% 89 61.0% 146 100%
The strategy choice “right” indicates the kick or the jump to the kicker’s natural side. (Percentages
may not add up to 100 due to rounding.)
to choose the centre due to their own technical deficiencies. In this case, they would
however underestimate the fact that the ball does not always travel in the intended
direction.
H4: Choice of natural side by goalkeepers and kickers together : For both groups it
can be confirmed that the goalkeepers jump more often to the natural side (A: 75; B:
89) than the kickers kick the ball there (A: 53; B: 66). This discrepancy is marginally
significant (A: t = 1.9; B: t = 1.8).
H5: Choice of the natural side by the kicker and the goalkeeper : The kickers in the
amateurs group and in the beginners group choose the natural side (A: 53; B: 66) not
much more frequently than the left (A: 51; B: 52). This discrepancy is not significant
(A: t = 0.2; B: t = 1.3). This is not valid for the goalkeepers who in both groups jump
significantly (A: t = 5.2 B: t = 6.2) more often to the natural side (A: 75; B: 89) than
to the left side (A: 28; B: 30). Although they confirm the hypothesis by that, they
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Table 9: Empirical distribution of scoring probabilities of amateur kickers and goalies
in percentages.
goalie
left centre right
left 33.3 57.1 65.2 51.0
kicker centre 0.0 16.7 63.6 44.4
right 100.0 50.0 39.0 47.2
46.4 42.1 50.7 48.4
The strategy choice “right” indicates the kick or the jump to the kicker’s natural side. The figures in
the cells correspond to the empirical scoring probabilities (i.e. the ratio of scored goals and kicks) for
the kicker. The probabilities of saving for the goalkeeper result from the converse probability.
Table 10: Empirical distribution of scoring probabilities of completely unexperienced
kickers and the goalies in percentages.
goalie
left centre right
left 22.7 50.0 65.4 46.2
kicker centre 66.7 0.0 50.0 21.4
right 80.0 16.7 21.8 28.8
36.7 11.1 37.1 32.2
The strategy choice “right” indicates the kick or the jump to the kicker’s natural side. The figures in
the cells correspond to the empirical scoring probabilities (i.e. the ratio of scored goals and kicks) for
the kicker. The probabilities of saving for the goalkeeper result from the converse probability.
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probably anticipate only conditionally the kickers’ suboptimal behaviour.
H6: Equality of success probability for all strategies of kickers and goalkeepers: Table
11 and 12 show that for both groups of untrained kickers the probabilities of success are
not the same for all options. The strategy choice differs rather strong from the predicted
optimal rate and no pattern is detectable. The same is valid for the goalkeepers. Their
strategy choice also does not indicate optimising behaviour.
Table 11: Predicted and actual probabilities of strategy choice of amateur kickers and
goalies in percentages.
kicker goalie
left centre right left centre right
predicted 59.0 0.0 41.0 9.6 90.4 0
actual 41.8 14.8 43.4 23.0 4.9 61.5
The strategy choice “right” indicates the kick or the jump to the kicker’s natural side.
Table 12: Predicted and actual probabilities of strategy choices for completely unexpe-
rienced kickers and goalies in percentages.
kicker goalie
left centre right left centre right
predicted 69.9 0.0 31.1 36.8 63.2 0
actual 35.6 19.2 45.2 20.5 18.5 61.0
The strategy choice “right” indicates the kick or the jump to the kicker’s natural side.
H7: Choice of the centre depending on the technical abilities: The professional kick-
ers chose the centre in 14.5% of all kicks (cf. table 4). For the untrained amateurs this
value amounts to 14.8% (cf. table 7) and for the beginners to 19.2% (cf. table 8). The
predicted pattern is therefore not detectable. The less gifted kickers do not choose the
centre more often in order to make sure that the ball reaches the goal.
For untrained actors kicking a penalty the Minimax theorem proves to be an unsuitable
explanation. Only the physiologically caused bias towards the natural side can be con-
firmed. This failure of Minimax may have empirical as well as theoretical reasons. As
outlined above, the data of the untrained actors differ from those of the players of the
German Bundesliga in several aspects. Whereas the latter are most valid and the result
of the action definitely suggests a player’s intention, this is not necessarily so in the first
case. This is especially true for the beginners. It is correct to a lesser degree for the
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not entirely inexperienced amateurs and above all for the goalkeepers. Especially with
the latter, the decision (jump to the left or the right, or stay in the centre) is safely
detectable and the intention is easily assignable. The fact that they still do not show
strategically optimal behaviour suggests a theoretical problem. (1) The data show that
with untrained actors there are some penalty kicks where the players do not act simul-
taneously, but the goalkeepers react to the kickers’ actions. This does not mean that
the actors do not find themselves in a circle of expectations before kicking. Certainly
both players hold their cards close to their chests and do not want to disclose their
intentions. However, the two goalkeepers apparently succeed in exploiting the kickers’
technical deficiencies. For the lacking confirmation of the hypotheses not only empirical
and football-related problems may be presented. The untrained actors are apparently
not capable of optimal strategic behaviour in a penalty kick.
4.2 Results: micro level
If the Minimax theorem is interpreted as a prediction for the optimisation of individual
behaviour, the hypotheses should also apply on the individual level of single players.
This empirical analysis can be carried out solely for the professional players because
only with them data about an individual sequence of penalty kicks does exist. Fortu-
nately, for all players the penalty situation is the same, independently of the goalkeepers
involved (cf. section 4.1), such that penalties from a specific player can be considered as
being independent actions (Chiappori et al. 2002: 1144). Yet, there is an unavoidable
reduction in the number of cases. Namely only those players who were involved in a
sufficiently high number of penalties during the observation period are relevant for the
statistical analysis. Goalkeepers fulfil these conditions more easily since per team there
is only one goalkeeper19 compared to 11 potential penalty kickers.20 In addition, goal-
keepers play more matches per season compared to field players and they tend to have
longer careers. Because of this they have a higher chance during the entire sample period
to be observed. Subsequently, for the individual analyses a total of 13 goalkeepers who
were involved in between 21 and 40 penalty situations were observed. This can still be
well substantiated statistically. In contrast, 7 of the 12 observed kickers had less than 21
kicks. However, the statistic analyses presented here are carried out with the necessary
caution. In order to not further reduce the case numbers, the few kicks to the centre (a
19Note that the goalkeeper cannot be chosen for the task of stopping a penalty. Simply the goalkeeper
who is in charge at the moment a penalty is imposed, has to take over this task.
20In contrast to the goalie, the kicker of the penalty can be chosen out of all 11 players that are in
charge at the moment the team gets a penalty kick assigned. Normally, in a team there are a handful
of kickers – very seldom goalkeepers themselves – that take over this task.
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total of 25 with the observed kickers) are herewith counted as to the natural right side,
with the above mentioned argument that kicks to the centre are often performed with
the same kicking technique as kicks to the natural side (cf. also Palacios-Huerta 2003).
In return, on the goalkeepers’ side, the very few kicks that did not reach the goal or hit
the goal frame and therefore did not have to be stopped, are excluded.
H5ind: Choice of the natural side by individual kickers and goalkeepers: On the
aggregate level it could be confirmed that the natural side is preferred over the “left”
one. On the individual level this is clearly not the case. Only 8 out of 12 kickers
actually choose their natural side more often than the other one (cf. table 13). The
other 4 players to a greater or lesser extent show a significant preference for the “left”
side.
The goalkeepers have correct expectations in the respect of not choosing the natural
side more often. Only four goalkeepers more frequently jump to the kicker’s natural
side. Lehmann chooses each side equally often (cf. table 13). Together with the fact
that the estimations for the goalkeepers are statistically more valid this leads to the
rejection of the hypothesis on the level of single players.
H6ind: Equality of success probability on both sides for individual kickers and goal-
keepers: Due to the small number of cases Fisher’s exact test is used for examination
instead of the χ2-test. This shows that the assumption can be confirmed. 6 out of 12
kickers show a perfect distribution of the scoring probability (cf. table 13). Only for the
kickers Ailton and Anderbru¨gge the hypothesis must be rejected on a nearly significant
level (Ailton missed too often on the right, Anderbru¨gge too often on the left). For the
goalkeepers these findings are also apparent. At most Kahn or Kiraly could give the
kickers cause for assuming that they have a lower chance of defence on one of the sides
rather than on the other (cf. table 13). Because each player is a test of the hypothesis,
with 25 tests carried out and an assumed significance level of 0.1, about 2.5 false-negative
tests are expected. This accounts for the three rejections of the hypothesis. This is also
confirmed by a KS test which shows that the common distribution of all single tests
also comes about as a product of coincidental processes, as the p-values show: If the
hypothesis of statistical independence and therewith the equality of success probability
is rejected, a mistake is made with the likelihood of 82.9% (goalkeepers), 76.2% (kickers)
or 61.1% (all players). The predicted equality of the probability of success can herewith
be proven on both sides.
From table 13 it can also be concluded that neither the “dead sure” kicker nor the
“penalty killer” exists. All the kickers and goalkeepers have similar success rates, which
hardly differ from the average scoring rate (cf. also Kuss et al. 2007). The best observed
goalkeeper is Reitmaier with a saving rate of 30.0%. Neither Kahn, Lehmann, or Butt
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Table 13: Distribution of scored, and stopped penalties, respectively
player n no success L no success R success L success R sig.
kicker:
Ailton 21 0 4 8 9 0.13
Anderbru¨gge 21 3 2 3 13 0.12
Balakov 21 1 1 11 8 1.00
Butt 29 1 3 11 14 0.62
Cardoso 16 1 1 4 10 1.00
Ha¨ßler 19 2 1 9 7 1.00
Heldt 16 2 2 4 8 0.60
Herzog 17 2 1 4 10 0.52
Kirsten 16 1 1 10 4 1.00
Polster 22 0 3 7 12 0.52
Winkler 15 2 2 6 5 1.00
Zorc 20 2 2 7 9 1.00
NS 233 17 23 84 109
goalie:
Butt 23 5 12 2 4 1.00
Golz 37 16 12 6 3 0.71
Heinen 23 10 10 2 1 1.00
Kahn 45 17 20 6 2 0.24
Kiraly 22 5 14 2 1 0.23
Klos 21 7 8 3 3 1.00
Koch 26 6 17 1 2 1.00
Lehmann 30 11 13 4 2 0.65
Pieckenhagen 28 8 12 4 4 0.69
Reck 31 15 12 1 3 0.33
Reitmaier 40 19 9 10 2 0.45
Rost 33 15 13 2 3 0.66
Schmadtke 21 11 9 0 1 0.48
NT 380 145 161 43 31
“R” (right) indicates the kick or the jump to the kicker’s natural side. The abbreviations stand for:
“no success L” = no success with shot to the “left” side (kicker), respectively no success by diving to
the “left” side (goalkeeper); ditto for R (natural side). “success L” = scored with shot to the “left”
side (kicker), respectively stopped ball by diving to the “left” side (goalkeeper); ditto for R (natural
side). “sig.” indicates the significance level of Fisher’s exact test on differences in the scoring, and
stopping probabilities, respectively.
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Table 14: runs-test on random choices of the sides in series of penalties
player niL n
i
R runsexp runsact z p
kicker:
Ailton 8 13 11 14 1.71 0.09*
Anderbru¨gge 6 15 10 10 0.52 0.61
Balakov 12 9 11 13 1.01 0.31
Butt 12 17 15 12 -1.00 0.32
Cardoso 5 11 8 10 1.60 0.11
Ha¨ssler 11 8 10 8 -0.86 0.39
Heldt 6 10 8 9 0.55 0.58
Herzog 6 11 9 11 1.51 0.13
Kirsten 11 5 8 8 0.38 0.70
Polster 7 15 11 11 0.48 0.63
Winkler 8 7 8 10 1.09 0.27
Zorc 9 11 11 14 1.67 0.09*
goalie:
Butt 7 16 11 9 -0.63 0.53
Golz 22 15 22 27 1.77 0.08*
Heinen 12 11 13 11 -0.63 0.53
Kahn 23 22 17 14 -1.06 0.29
Kiraly 7 15 11 10 -0.21 0.83
Klos 10 11 11 10 -0.44 0.66
Koch 7 19 12 10 -0.83 0.40
Lehmann 15 15 17 21 1.48 0.14
Pieckenhagen 12 16 15 13 -0.48 0.63
Reck 16 15 24 23 -0.29 0.77
Reitmaier 29 11 17 16 -0.18 0.86
Rost 17 16 19 22 1.18 0.24
Schmadtke 11 10 11 11 0.01 0.99
niL or n
i
R stands for the number of kicks or jumps of the player i to the left or right side. runsexp
indicate the number of runs expected under statistical independence and runsact the number of actual
runs. The number of runs expected under H0 arises from rounded values. For small case numbers
a continuity correction was carried out. The p-value indicates the probability corresponding to the
z-value. For cases marked with * the working hypothesis is rejected with 90% or more.
who in German media, from experts21 and literature (Leininger and Ockenfels 2007) are
considered outstanding when it comes to defending penalties, have saving rates (or a
strategic saving behaviour) which stand out significantly from the sample average.
H8: Randomisation in sequence of individual kickers and goalkeepers: This hypoth-
esis is the only one referring exclusively to the individual level of single players. In order
to be unpredictable for the opponent the choices of sides in a sequence of penalty situa-
tions have to be randomly distributed. This statistical examination is carried out using
a runs-test,22 which examines whether an observed number of runs differs significantly
21Kahn and Lehmann were keepers of the national team.
22A “run” here is a sequence of identical decisions. If the decision alters a new run starts. In four
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from the number of runs which are to be expected in a random choice of sides.
In table 14 the corresponding values for the kickers and goalkeepers are indicated.
It becomes obvious that for the kickers Ailton and Zorc the hypothesis of a randomly
chosen sequence has to be rejected with a certainty of more than 90%. Cardoso and
Herzog are also to be found in the area of rejection. These players change their sides too
often and by that illustrate a behaviour which was observed in the laboratory as well.
However, for the other eight kickers the predicted hypothesis of random choice cannot
be rejected. As with the kickers the runs-test is also carried out for the goalkeepers.
This shows that only Golz and Lehmann fail in randomising their sides because they
also change the sides too often. For the eleven other goalkeepers the hypothesis can
be verified (cf. table 14). Again, with a total of 25 tests carried out and an assumed
significance level of 0.1, about 2.5 false-negative tests are expected. This is close to
the 4 tests, where the hypothesis is rejected. Contrary to most laboratory results23 but
in accordance with the other examinations of real penalty kicks the game-theoretical
prediction of randomisation in series can be verified by that.
Therefore, on an individual level two general hypotheses can be confirmed. This con-
clusion however, does not apply to the third individual hypothesis on the choice of the
natural side (H5), which is rejected. In addition it becomes obvious that the subopti-
mal decisions in the field differ from the optimum in the same direction which is also
detected in laboratory experiments.
5 Training or selection?
From the previous sections it is known that amateurs players perform worse in any aspect
(technical skills and strategic abilities) of penalty taking than professional athletes.
But neither all the professionals show optimal strategic behaviour. This raises the
following question: Is strategically successful penalty taking learned24, or are gifted
players selected into their roles? To answer this question strategically optimal behavior
must be distinguished from technically skillful action in penalty taking.
decisions there are e.g. theoretically four runs possible at maximum (LRLR, or vice versa). This
maximum amount of runs is as likely as the minimum number (namely one) of runs. The number of
runs which have the highest probability and originate from a random process amount to, in contrast,
two or three in four decisions. Therefore there should not be too much alternating so that the process
appears to be a random one.
23Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) form an exception.
24This could happen by purposeful training or unconsciously just by routine (cf. e.g. Raab and
Johnson 2006; Walker and Wooders 2001).
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This can be done with a look to the success rates of of different groups of kickers
and goalkeepers. From table 5 it can be seen that the saving rate for very engaged
goalkeepers in the individual sample is lower (19.5%) than that of all goalkeepers within
the observation period (24.4%, calculated from table 13). For the kickers these tables
show just the conversed pattern. The kickers who shot many penalties have a higher
scoring rate of 82.8% on average (Balakov has the highest with 90.5%) compared to the
total rate based on all eleven seasons (75.6%). This is important in several respects:
(1) It indicates that penalty kicking is mainly a random process which the players
cannot escape from (cf. also Kuss et al. 2007). This is however, very often hawked
by the players thinking that by making a list they may find out about the opponents’
favourite strategies.25 But apparently what a current goalkeeper of the Swiss national
team suspects in an interview seems to be rather the case. After making lists of kickers’
strategies he hardly saved any penalties. Only after not paying further attention to
the lists and relying only on his gut feeling (say: chance) he succeeded again in saving
penalties. (2) Successful behaviour in penalty situations can apparently not be acquired
through routine. The results of goalkeepers who were in many of these situations are
worse than the overall average. This talent seems to be acquired elsewhere, since the
kickers who are often chosen for penalties justify this trust. This fits together with the
fact, that successful players do not seem to know correctly how they take their decisions.
They rather do that intuitively.
Further hints can be found regarding hypothesis 5 again. H5 is applicable on the
aggregate of all observed players, where it is confirmed empirically (cf. section 4.1.1).26
In addition, this hypothesis is also confirmed for the aggregate macro level of the sub-
sample of the players who often take penalties, and are therefore used for the tests on
the micro level. As predicted by H5 these kickers kicked more often to the natural side
(132 kicks) than to “left” (101 kicks, significant difference t = 2.0). Correspondingly
the goalkeepers also chose more often the natural side (192 jumps) than the “left” (188
jumps), though this difference is not significant ( t = 0.2). However, on the micro level
of the individual players of the subsample, H5ind is rejected for 4 out of 12 kickers, and
particularly even for 9 out of 13 goalies. Of these goalkeepers, neither the ones that
were widely considered to be the best (namely Kahn, Lehmann and Butt, cf. section
25E.g., during the World Cup of 2006 there was the commonly held belief, that the German goalkeeper
Lehmann was made privy to the kicking directions of his Argentine opponents from a note given to
him before the penalty shootout of the quarter-final. Indeed, he stopped three balls and Germany won.
But - according to game theoretical predictions – it turned out that Lehmann did not know the kicking
directions from this note, but was simply lucky.
26Certainly it should be kept in mind that many players in the full sample did not have a chance of
behaving suboptimally due to their little participation in penalty kicks.
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4.2), neither the one that is actually the best in stopping penalties (Reitmaier) show an
optimal strategic performance. This means, that strategic behaviour is not optimized
through routine. For the goalkeepers that were involved in most penalties (the ones
already mentioned plus Golz and Rost), H5ind cannot be confirmed as well (cf. table
13). For the kickers this pattern is conversed. The best kicker (Balakov) also shows
strategically perfect behaviour, and the individual strategic behaviour of kickers is over-
all better than the one of the goalies. So, players with good strategic abilities seem to
have been gifted with this talent. Hence, it is plausible that these players were selected
into their roles of taking penalties, rather than having learned it.
This thesis of selection can be substantiated by further consideration: (1) Penal-
ties are not the only situation in football in which mixed strategies have to be used
for a maximisation of benefits (cf. Moschini 2004). In fact, the entire game consists
considerably of such strategic situations. Therefore suitable talented actors should be
successful more often in the game. This consideration is confirmed by the high rate
of of left-footed players (36.1% ) among professional players. The rate of left-footed
people in the general population is only about 10%. As a consequence this rate can also
be found in the population of the untrained players (see table 2). I.e. that left-footed
players are selected more often into professional football than right-footed players. This
may be partly the case because players on the left side of the field benefit from being
left-footed. But it may also happen due to the fact that left-footed players are used to
encountering right-footed players, particularly in the beginning of their career. The re-
verse however, is not the case. Therefore, a left-footed player compared to a right-footed
player has a relative advantage. This phenomenon is also known in tennis or boxing.
In boxing southpaws have a relative advantage over orthodox fighters in the same way
that left-handed players in tennis have an advantage over right-handed players.27
6 Discussion
In this article the penalty situation is being examined as an example of interactions in
which the actors have contrary and therefore by definition selfish interests. It is espe-
cially analysed whether trained and untrained players behave in the way of strategically
maximising their benefits according to the requirements of the Minimax theorem in this
real-life situation. For the empirical examination of the derived hypotheses a data set
of trained professional players from the German Bundesliga and a data set of untrained
players is used.
27Personal communication with Daniel Ackermann, Peter Hobusch and Jochen Berger, Departement
of Sports, University of Leipzig.
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Regarding the aggregate patterns of interacting players the Minimax predictions for
trained professional players can be confirmed. This result is in accordance with evidence
from the literature. For the aggregate patterns of untrained players this is not the case.
The behaviour of the untrained players cannot be predicted with Minimax. I.e. that
these players are potentially exploitable by strategically rational players. For the tests
on an individual level of single players, only the data set of professional actors can be
used. The results of this examination are ambivalent. The analysed actors do make
decisions according to the Minimax predictions in most situations. But, one hypothesis
must be rejected. The Minimax solution therefore seems to be a behavioural tendency
of single experienced actors.
Minimax therefore only satisfactorily explains the behaviour of trained players but
not the behaviour of untrained ones. An evident assumption is that the professional
athletes learned this optimal strategic behaviour to different extents. However, exami-
nation of the micro level of single trained actors suggests a different explanation. The
players did not learn optimal strategic behaviour28, but rather have been selected into
their roles through an evolutionary process. Strategically gifted players asserted them-
selves over less gifted players in professional sports competition. Doubtlessly all actors
in the observed zero-sum-interaction aimed at a strategic maximisation of their benefit.
However, this rational motives do not lead directly to aggregate patterns of behaviour
that are predicted by the Minimax theorem. For this, to many actors in an unsorted
population lack the abilities to reach the aim of being strategically not exploitable. Only
after a the long lasting competitive situation of professional sports has selected the ac-
cordingly gifted players, Minimax makes suitable prediction about the behaviour of the
players on the individual level of single players, as much as on the aggregate level. These
selected actors behave as if they decide rationally on an individual level, mostly without
being aware of it (cf. Friedman 1953). Hence, the aggregate patterns of behaviour are
not the result of a purposeful design, but of an evolutionary process. Proceeding one
step further it can be speculated that social institutions that deal with mixed equilibria,
tend to promote rational behaviour because they emerged from a similar evolutionary
process. In this sense, the Minimax theorem therefore cannot be interpreted as a psycho-
logical behaviour pattern. A sociological interpretation in the sense of Coleman (1986)
in which not the type of actor but the interaction situation is vital, rather seems to
be adequate. Rationality then is not an individual characteristic but can be considered
with Vernon Smith (2003) as ecological rationality which arises from the interaction.
Applying this finding to concrete situations, it can be concluded that the Minimax
theorem provides correct predictions when experienced experts interact. This may be
28For technical and for physiological skills this certainly applies.
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the case for the interaction of the police and habitual criminals, tax authorities and
tax consultants or in war. For the interaction of unexperienced actors (petty thieves
or occasional tax evaders) with experienced ones (police or tax authorities) it can be
concluded that the experts will be able to predict and therefore exploit their unex-
perienced counterparts. At last the interaction of unexperienced actors (like terrorist
and their victims) cannot be predicted by Minimax. The observed pattern of these
unexperienced actors then may be caused by some non-maximizing, and therefore ex-
ploitable behaviour, like e.g. habits, adherence to social norms, or physiologically or
psychologically guided heuristics.
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Appendix
Given the following model of penalty kicking in normal form with the strategies {left,
centre, right}. a to i indicate the empirical probabilities of scoring (cf. table 5 and
9/19) for the corresponding strategy combinations and p to q the optimal distribution
of probabilities for the strategy of goalkeeper and kicker resulting from it.
goalie
p q 1− p− q
left centre right
p left a b c
kicker q centre d e f
1− p− q right g h i
In a mixed equilibrium all three strategies must show the same expected utility.
Therefore, first the expected utility of the strategy “left” of the kicker is equated with
the one of his strategy “centre”. Thereto the probabilities of the strategies of the
goalkeeper are used:
p · a+ q · b+ (1− p− q) · c = p · d+ q · e+ (1− p− q) · f
p =
c− f
c− f + d− a
−
e− b+ c− f
c− f + d− a
· q
Then the same is done with the kicker’s strategies “left” and “right”:
p · a+ q · b+ (1− p− q) · c = p · g + q · h+ (1− p− q) · i
p =
c− i
c− i+ g − a
−
h− b+ c− i
c− i+ g − a
· q
Equating both conditions allows for solving the equation for q :
c− f
c− f + d− a
−
e− b+ c− f
c− f + d− a
· q =
c− i
c− i+ g − a
−
h− b+ c− i
c− i+ g − a
· q
q = −
id− ia+ af − cd+ cg − fg
ia− ib− id+ ie+ ae− ce− ge− bd− af + cd+ bf − ah+ bg − cg + ch+ dh+ fg − fh
Now q can be inserted and the equation can also be solved for p:
p = −
ib− ie+ ce− bf − ch+ fh
ia− ib− id+ ie+ ae− ce− ge− bd− af + cd+ bf − ah+ bg − cg + ch+ dh+ fg − fh
By inserting the empirical scoring probabilities now the optimal empirical probabilities
p, q and 1− p− q can be identified, with which the goalkeeper should choose the three
options{left, centre, right}. Analogously can be proceeded for the expected utility of the
goalkeeper and the optimal empirical probabilities p, q and 1− p− q can be identified,
with which the kicker should choose between the options {left, centre, right}.
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